The US Senate has advanced a long-awaited bipartisan bill to impose more restrictions on major buyers of Russian energy and extend penalties against Iran, paving the way for passage of long-stalled legislation championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham. The bill allows US President Donald Trump to impose tariffs on the world's top five purchasers of Russian oil or natural gas, including India and China.
BEIRUT — As the Iran war escalates again, Gulf Arab states are looking to China — not Washington — to use its economic leverage over Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, testing how far Beijing is able and willing to pressurize Tehran.
The Gulf push for a bigger Chinese role is driven by growing frustration, Gulf sources say. The war launched with U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28 has hurt their regional foe but also restricted their vital energy exports and, to varying degrees, put them in the firing line.
With Iran and its allies threatening the Bab el-Mandeb waterway in the Red Sea as well as Hormuz, Gulf States sought Beijing's help, conscious that the war has exposed the limits of American power, three regional sources say.
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi held dozens of calls and meetings with counterparts seeking a new ceasefire, while special envoy Zhai Jun held talks in Gulf Arab capitals as well as Iran.
People are also reading…
Vessels are seen June 16 in the Strait of Hormuz from Musandam, Oman.
"China has maintained close communication with all parties, and has consistently worked to stop the fighting and promote peace," its foreign ministry said in response to a request for comment.
China's position as both a major buyer of oil from across the Gulf and Iran's biggest trading partner presents opportunities but also sensitivities.
"There's huge respect between the Gulf and China and they are a big trading partner, so any issue is raised in a very quiet manner," one Gulf source said.
Iran says it will maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz, noting it was attacked during negotiations over the nuclear program the U.S. and Israel vowed to destroy.
Gulf governments ultimately hope that Beijing will steer Tehran toward a negotiated settlement, said the source, adding that China often moves slowly and cautiously. But they are aware that a prolonged war may also serve China's interest by piling pressure on the United States.
Hengli Petrochemical's complex is seen July 16, 2018, at Changxing island in Dalian, Liaoning province, China.
Rivalry constraints
China has developed close trade and investment ties with the six states in the Gulf Cooperation Council - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — since a Gulf-China summit in 2022. Another summit is planned this year in Riyadh but not yet confirmed.
But Beijing refrained from publicly challenging Tehran's threats to shipping, fueling doubts about how far China is prepared to go to secure the Gulf and its exports.
"The Chinese are trying to be more involved, they are trying to be more helpful," a second Gulf source said. "But China has turned out not to be as influential as we thought — whether that is a lack of will or a lack of capacity is debatable. What seems to happen when America enters the fray is that superpower calculations dominate over everything else."
Henry Tugendhat, a China specialist at the Washington Institute, told Reuters that Beijing's overriding priority is preserving relationships across the region rather than risking diplomatic fallout by openly siding with either camp.
The oil tanker HELGA is berthed April 24 at one of Iraq's southern offshore oil terminals near Basra as it prepares to load crude oil, becoming the second vessel to arrive since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Once Washington became directly involved, Beijing's calculations extended beyond the Gulf itself to encompass its wider ties and rivalry with Washington.
"Gulf governments can buy Chinese technology, investment and drones, but what they cannot buy is Chinese leverage that operates independently of (its relations with) Washington," a source with direct knowledge of China's discussions said.
China's President Xi Jinping is expected in the United States for talks with President Donald Trump on Sept. 24. China's foreign ministry said Xi put forward a four-point proposal to safeguard and promote peace and stability in the Middle East and also proposed backing countries in the region to advance development, security and cooperation.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump on May 15 after a visit to the Zhongnanhai Garden in Beijing, China.
Balancing their interests
China has leveraged its deep economic ties to push into Middle East diplomacy, brokering a surprise diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 that is now being put to the test.
Beijing is pushing Pakistan to mediate between Washington and Tehran for a resumption of peace talks, three Pakistani sources told Reuters last week. China will continue to "play an active role in restoring peace and tranquillity in the Middle East Gulf region as soon as possible," its foreign ministry said then.
China also held direct talks with Yemen's Houthi movement to enable its tankers to sail through the southern Red Sea without being attacked after the Iran-aligned militia pledged to prevent access to Saudi ports, six sources with knowledge of the matter said this week. China's transport ministry did not respond to a request to comment on that.
Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said narrow bilateral arrangements that helped shield Chinese-linked shipping were the only visible outcome of its diplomatic efforts so far.
"Beyond that, it's hard to see what else China has been able — or willing — to achieve," she said, arguing that the war allowed China to protect its interests while increasing voter pressure on U.S. and European leaders from energy price rises.
China benefited from a steep discount on Iranian oil resulting from international sanctions on Iran. Over the years, it increased support for Iranian security through dual-use components, chip equipment and satellite navigation systems, while not overtly providing military aid since the war began.

